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RICO: IS IT A PANACEA OR A BITTER PILL
FOR LABOR UNIONS, UNION DEMOCRACY
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING?
I. INTRODUCrION

Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute' ("RICO") in 1970. Its aim was to take on the ever
increasing problem of organized crime's corruptive grip on legitimate
businesses and unions.2 RICO was a fresh approach to the problem
of uprooting organized crime? "[T]he RICO statute was intended to
provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon
organized crime and its economic roots."4 However, RICO does not
exist in a vacuum. The statute also affects legitimate interests, such as
those of labor.'
Criminal and civil RICO actions brought by the government can
affect labor interests in both positive and negative ways. The emplacement by the government of a RICO trustee upon a labor union
to, in effect, purge the union of the influence of organized crime or
traditional labor racketeering and the use of other such equitable relief
undermines the notion of union democracy. However, the government
does attempt to ensure that true union democracy will be restored.
This is bitter medicine indeed, but such action is necessary in certain
situations to ensure union democracy, legitimate collective bargaining,
and the continued support of organized labor by the federal government. The government uses civil RICO actions to replace duly elected
union officials with RICO trustees who oversee elections, investigate
charges, discipline union members, review and expenditures and contracts. However, in the hands of private individuals and corporations,
civil RICO is not bitter medicine. Rather, it is a poison which seems

1. Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act
941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968
2. Randy M. Mastro, et al., Private Plaintiffs'
RICO Statute: A Means to Reform Corrupted Labor

of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
(1988)).
Use of Equitable Remedies Under the
Unions. 24 MICH. J.L. REF. 571, 574

(1991).
3.

Mastro, supra note 2, at 575.

4. Mastro, supra note 2, at 575 (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26
(1983)).
5. These interests include preservation of union democracy, union organization, and the
collective bargaining process.
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to always adversely affect labor's interests. Civil RICO actions
brought by employers against their collective bargaining partners serve

as a setback for the American labor movement.6
In this article, I will briefly describe RICO and its interaction
with other statutes that affect labor and show RICO's disproportionate
effect on those statutes in an effort to illustrate and distinguish gov-

ernment and private use of civil RICO. I will also review recent court
decisions which demonstrate that civil RICO in private hands is being
utilized in the labor arena in ways which were never contemplated,
creating a disruptive rather than a stabilizing force in labor relations.
Finally, I will consider some persistent constitutional questions that
civil RICO presents, especially in light of employees' right to bargain
collectively. I conclude that the disruptive force of private civil RICO
litigation in the field of labor relations should be proscribed.

II. RICO
A.

The Statute

A unique aspect of the RICO statute is that it does not make

illegal any specific action that is not otherwise illegal.7 Indeed, Sections 1961(1) of RICO prohibits racketeering activities.8 Collectively,

6. Howard S. Simonoff & Theodore M. Lieverman, The RICO-ization of Federal Labor
Law: An Argument for Broad Preemption, 8 LAB. LAW. 335 (1992).
The use of RICO lawsuits against unions by employers during labor disputes
threatens a return to a darker, more sinister era of labor relations in the United
States. Once denounced as criminal syndicates, then antitrust conspiracies, then
communist fronts, American labor unions now increasingly face being labeled as
racketeering conspiracies for which they may be liable for treble damages and sizeable attorneys' fees. Although use of the RICO statute is commonly believed to be
for rooting out corruption and organized crime, private RICO litigation has no such
interest or limitation. To the contrary, it usually is aimed directly at conduct arising out of bona fide labor disputes, where there is no hint of "racketeering" on
the part of the unions.
Simonoff & Lieverman, supra, at 335-36 (footnote omitted).
7. G. Robert Blakey & Ronald Goldstock, "On the Waterfront": RICO and Labor
Racketeering, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 341, 348 (1980).
8. Section 1961(1) provides in pertinent part:
"[Riacketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing
in narcotic or other dangerous drug, which is chargeable under State law punishable by imprisonment for more than one year;, (B) any act which is indictable
under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201
(relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and
473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate ship-
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these sections include eight felonies under state law and at least

twenty-four federal felonies, among which are certain labor related
offenses, such as restrictions on payments and loans to labor unions,

and embezzlement from union funds." This gives RICO a blanket or
umbrella-like effect which allows it to reach a wide range of activi-

ties. When a person commits two of these RICO prohibited racketeering offenses, normally referred to as "predicate acts" for the purposes of RICO,1 a pattern of racketeering activity can be established." RICO was designed to be broad and flexible enough to

meet the various situations in which organized crime finds, takes
over, and controls legitimate businesses and unions, as well as illegitimate entities. 2 Rather than concentrating on just isolated acts or

ment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to
embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1029 (relative to fraud and related activity in
connection with access devices), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to
wire fraud), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating
to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to obstruction of State or local law enforcement),
section 1512 (relating to tampering with witness, victim, or informant), sections
1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery or extortion), section 1952
(relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments),
section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), section
1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary instruments), section 1957 (relating to
engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful
activity), sections 2251 through 2252 (relating to sexual exploitation of children),(sic) section 1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the
commission of murder-for-hire), . . . sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate
transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to the
transportation of stolen property), section 2321 (relating to trafficking in certain
motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts) sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in
contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act
which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with
restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a cause under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or felonious
manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United
States, or (E) any act which is indictable under Currency and Foreign Transactions
Reporting Act.
18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
9. Id. See Mastro, supra note 2, at 575.
10. Mastro, supra note 2, at 586-87 n.110 (stating that the phrase "predicate act" is a
term of art).
11. See Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 7, at 348-49.
12. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 7, at 349.
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events, RICO allows an attack on a much wider scope."
RICO's provisions provide four possible paths for criminal prosecution and civil litigation.'4 First, it is unlawful for any person to
receive any income, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activities."5 Second, it is unlawful for any person, through a pattern of
racketeering activity, to acquire an interest, directly or indirectly, in
an enterprise. 6 Third, it is unlawful for any person to participate,
directly or indirectly, in any enterprise through racketeering activity. 7
Finally, it is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
first three provisions."
1. The Person
RICO provides that a "'person' includes any individual or entity
capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."' 9 However, "[a]s a matter of statutory construction courts will generally
afford 'includes' a broader interpretation than the word 'means.' This
canon of construction is premised on the assumption that 'including'
is not a restrictive term, but one of enlargement. ' Consequently, a
court can reach the conclusion that an item not specifically identified
may still be included in the statute.2 Thus, there is no dispute that
union officers, union members, and even a union itself can fall within
RICO's definition of a "person."
2. The Enterprise
RICO provides that an enterprise "includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union
or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."' The rule of statutory construction for enterprise, like the statutory construction for person, is one of expansion, not of limitation. '
13. Prior to RICO "it was nearly impossible to reach legitimate businesses which served
to launder money." Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 7, at 349.
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1964 (1988).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3).
20. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 7, at 350 (footnote omitted).
21. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 7, at 350 (citing United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d
879 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971) which held that RICO is not limited
to persons specifically intent on using interstate facilities).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
23. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 7,at 351. See supra note 20 and accompanying
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A labor
union can constitute an enterprise for the purposes of
4
2

RICO.

The element of an enterprise is crucial to the establishment of a
RICO violation, and the interpretation of the term has been far
reaching.' Thus, RICO has been able to reach into billiard parlors in
Chicago's as well as restaurants in New York,27 and because Congress did not distinguish between private and public entities,' RICO
has also reached various local29 and state government agencies."
3.

The Pattern

RICO provides that a pattern of racketeering activity "requires at
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the
effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within
ten years ... after the commission of a prior act of racketeering
activity."'" These acts of racketeering are termed "predicate acts" for
the purposes of RICO. 2 In addition, one must demonstrate the relationship between the predicate acts and "their temporal proximity, or
common goals, or similarity of methods, or repetitions."33 In fact the

text.
24. Either a local union, a larger international union, or both, depending on their constitutions, inter-linking bonds, body of rules, or offices may fit this definition. Mastro, supra
note 2, at 586.
25. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 7, at 350-54.
26. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974) (enjoining gambling activities at a billiards parlor), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
27. United States v. Ianniello, 824 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1987) (placing the notorious
Umberto's Clam House into receivership).
28. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 7, at 352.
29. United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that the Macon,
Georgia Police Department was an enterprise for the purposes of RICO), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 904 (1978).
30. United States v. Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding that the Pennsylvania Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes was an enterprise for the purposes of RICO),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) ("excluding any period of imprisonment").
32. Mastro, supra note 2, at 586-87.
33. Mastro, supra note 2, at 587 (quoting United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370,
1382 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 491 U.S. 907 (1989)). See G. Robert Blakey & Brian
Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 1009, 1030 (1980). "The racketeering acts must
have been connected with each other by some common scheme, plan, or motive so as to
constitute a pattern and not simply a series of disconnected acts." Id. (footnotes omitted).
However, acts unrelated to each other may still be "held together by a relationship to an
enterprise." Id. In fact, "[platterns have been found where the separate acts have had similar
purposes, results, participants, victims or methods." Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Supreme Court has stated that RICO's pattern of racketeering requirement is demonstrated through continuity plus relationship.'
Therefore, mere isolated acts, incidents, or events will not satisfy
RICO's pattern of racketeering requirement.
Upon examination of RICO Sections 1962(a)-(d), it becomes
clear that to establish a violation one must demonstrate that a person
is unlawfully receiving income, directly or indirectly, through a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an interest, directly or indirectly, in an enterprise, or is participating, directly or indirectly, in any
enterprise through racketeering activity, or that person has conspired
to do so.

B. The Labor Policy of RICO
RICO targets organized crime as it attempts to infiltrate legitimate businesses, including labor unions." However, this problem is
more complex in regard to labor unions because of the traditional
misuses of union power. 6 Labor racketeering traditionally consisted
of individuals using union power to promote a variety of illicit activities including misuse of funds, "sweetheart" deals, and "strike insurance."'37 Prior to RICO it had been difficult to prove these types of
charges because of the very nature of the illegal activity. For instance, in the context of syndicated crime, labor racketeering was not
perceived as a single action or event." Additionally, labor racketeering was usually conducted by members of organized crime who
would find, take control, and make use of the union for their own
personal profit.39 What RICO allows that prior legislation had not, is

an attack on entire organizations for their patterns and practices of
corruption, rather than chasing these racketeering criminals one-by-one
through the labyrinth of criminal law.'

34.
35.
ruption:
574-75.
36.

HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
Garth L. Mangum, RICO Versus Landrum-Griffin as Weapons Against Union CorThe Teamster Case, 40 LAB. L.J. 94, 98 (1989). See Mastro, supra note 2, at
Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 7, at 341-42.

37. For example, stealing union member's dues, manipulation of union welfare and pension funds, embezzlement, kick backs, bribery, extortion, phantom employees on payroll and
the like. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 7, at 342-46.
38. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 7, at 346-47.
39. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 7, at 347.
40. Mangum, supra note 35, at 98.
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C. RICO's Interaction with Other Statutes
In the field of labor law, there seems to be little that RICO
cannot reach. Furthermore, many of the federal labor law statutes and
previous racketeering statutes provide only fodder for finding predicate act violations which are needed for RICO's pattern of racketeering element. 4' Neither labor law statutes such as the NorrisLaGuardia Act, the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley Act, and the
Landrum-Griffin Act, nor the Hobbs Act, an earlier anti-racketeering
statute, have provided the preemptive sanctuary protection against
RICO actions one would expect to find in the national labor policy
pontificated by the United States.4'
1. Norris-LaGuardia Act
The policy behind the Norris-LaGuardia Act" is to limit the
power of the federal courts to enjoin the activities of labor organizations so that those organizations are free from interference, restraint,
or coercion by employers, thereby allowing union members to freely
associate, organize and collectively bargain without the fear of being
enjoined, except in very limited circumstances. However, temporary or
permanent restraining orders may be issued when there is witness
testimony in support of allegations made in a complaint that unlawful
acts have been threatened and will be committed unless restrained, or
have been committed and will continue to be committed unless restrained. Accordingly, judges have been quite reluctant to allow preliminary requests for trustees in civil RICO actions without evidentiary hearings4 4 which include discovery and effective
cross-examination of witnesses.45 This may have more to do with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure than with the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
but union defendants should raise both arguments when given the
opportunity. 6

41. See infra notes 49-54, 77-98 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 43-48, 70-98 and accompanying text.
43. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1988).
44. Id.; see also infra notes 46, 179 and accompanying text.
45. Deborah Squiers, Bar on Secret Testimony in RICO Suit Request by Government
Refused in Union Case, N.Y. LJ., Dec. 19, 1990, at I (regarding United States v. Local
1804-1, Judge Sand refused a request by the prosecutor to allow union members to testify
behind closed doors about corruption in the International Longshoreman's Association because
of the defendants' inability to challenge and assess the credibility of the witness).

46. See FED. R. Crv. P. 65.
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In addition, the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides that a burden of

clear proof of actual participation in unlawful activity must be met
before a member of a labor union is held responsible for that unlawful activity.47 However, civil RICO does not use this standard; rather,
civil RICO applies the lesser preponderance of the evidence standard.

48

2. Hobbs Act
The Hobbs Act of 193449 is anti-racketeering legislation directed
at threats and violence which interfere with commerce."0 In anticipat-

ing the use of extortion, the Hobbs Act defines extortion as the "obtaining of property from another, with his [or her] consent, induced
by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or

under color of official right,"'" and affecting interstate commerce. 2
The government's use of the Hobbs Act allows it to reach union
officers for creating, maintaining, or tolerating the existence of such a
situation. 3
RICO is not precluded by the Hobbs Act. Furthermore, Hobbs
Act violations can be used as predicate acts to prove a pattern of

racketeering activity.' However, not every act of violence which
interferes with interstate commerce is covered by the Hobbs Act,
because the Hobbs Act does not cover violence committed during a

47. 29 U.S.C. § 106; see infra note 343 and accompanying text.
48. See Wilcox v. First
Interstate Bank of Or., 815 F.2d 522, 533 (9th Cir. 1987)
(Boochever, J., dissenting). Judge Boochever criticized the majority for not using the state
standard of clear and convincing evidence when the predicate acts were state fraud statute
violations. Id. at 534.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988).
50. Section 1951(a) provides in pertinent part:
[w~hoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation
of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3).
53. Mastro, supra note 2, at 596, 603 (stating that union officers, whether or not they
participate directly or by aiding and abetting, are liable for acts of extortion under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2(a) (1988)).
54. See United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279, 289
(D.NJ. 1984). Among the predicate acts making up the RICO action against Local 560 was
the conviction of Anthony "Tony Pro" Provenzano on one count of Hobbs Act extortion. Id.
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lawful strike.5 In United States v. Enmons,56 the Supreme Court defined the word "wrongful" in the statute, limiting it "to those instances where the obtaining of the property would itself be 'wrongful' because the alleged extortionist has no lawful claim to that property."'
The Supreme Court did not agree with the government's broad construction of "wrongful," which would have included the use of force
to obtain legitimate union demands of higher wages, 8 that is, conduct that takes place openly during the course of a union's economic
strike which could be seen as coercive conduct because it obstructs
and delays commerce.59 The Supreme Court was aware that violence
to persons or property is not an unknown result in the tense environment of a prolonged labor dispute.' However, there is no exception
for such conduct in the Hobbs Act. The Supreme Court strictly construed this criminal statute, resolving ambiguity in favor of lenity and
noting that nothing in the language of the Hobbs Act or its legislative
history could lead to the conclusion that Congress intended the federal government to stand sentinel over the conduct of strikes.6 ' In consequence, the Supreme Court narrowly affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the government's action, five to four. 2
However, unlike the Hobbs Act, RICO is written in general
terms and creates liability for prescribed conduct regardless of the
status or final objectives of the individuals involved. 3 This is demonstrated in United States v. Thordarson.'"In Thordarson, the Ninth

55. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 379 (1973).
56. 410 U.S. 379 (1973). The employees of Gulf States Utilities Company were striking
in support of a new collective bargaining agreement and were charged with violating the
Hobbs Act for firing high-powered rifles at company transformers, blowing up a companytransformer substation, and conspiracy. Id. at 381-82.
57. Id. at 383. See also United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415 (1956) (upholding a
Hobbs Act prosecution where force and violence were employed to compel concessions from
the employer which the union had no legitimate right to demand).
58. Enmons, 410 U.S. at 383.
59. Id. "The worker who threw a punch on a picket line, or the striker who deflated the
tires on his employer's truck would be subject to a Hobbs Act prosecution and the possibility
of 20 years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine." Id. at 389.
60. Id. at 389 n.20.
61. Id. at 389.
62. Simonoff & Lieverman, supra note 6, at 363. Simonoff and Lieverman point out that
with the change of membership on the Supreme Court, Enmons' continued viability is questionable and that a number of lower courts have proceeded to restrict Enmons' application in
civil RICO cases.
63. See United States v Thordarson, 646 F.2d 1323, 1328 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1055 (1981).
64. 646 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981).
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Circuit determined that arson and the willful misuse of explosives
were serious enough threats for which Congress passed acts calling
for criminal sanctions.' The Ninth Circuit then went on to find that
for the enforcement of these laws, Congress did not distinguish between individuals indulging in the prohibited conduct for their own
personal gain and individuals indulging in the prohibited conduct for
the gain of fellow union members.' The Ninth Circuit distinguished
the type of low-level violence it felt the Supreme Court in Enmons
feared would become a federal crime under the Hobbs Act from the
destruction of vehicles by means of arson and explosives. 7 Thus,
under the circumstances presented, a pattern of racketeering activity
was forged with the inclusion of these Hobbs Act violations.' However, even if the Thordarson court did not find these actions to be
within the scope of the Hobbs Act, that court could have still forged
a pattern of racketeering activity utilizing RICO's wide scope in
regards to any of the state felonies enumerated in Section 1961(1) of
the statute. Indeed, RICO's definition of racketeering activity encompasses "any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling,
arson, robbery, bribery, extortion .... ."' Clearly the defendants'
actions in Thordarson would fall within the scope of this definition.
3.

Wagner Act

The Wagner Act, also known as the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935 ("NLRA"), ° gave employees enforceable rights usually
referred to as their Section 7 rights: "[e]mployees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."7 ' Clearly, when union
members feel that their Section 7 rights are being attacked they will

65. Id. at 1327-28. (citing The Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1988), and 18 U.S.C. §
844(i) (1988), which specifically deals with explosives).

66. Id. at 1328-31. See also United States v. Chambers, 515 F. Supp. 1, 3 (N.D. Ohio
1981) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), a statute which prohibits the malicious destruction of
property by means of explosives as containing no exceptions, expressed or implied, for those
acts committed in furtherance of a legitimate goal, in other words, the end does not justify

the means).
67. MdBut see United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 379 (1973).
68.

Thordarson, 646 F.2d at 1327-32.

69. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(I)(A).
70.
71.

29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (emphasis added).
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attempt to invoke the NLRA and its preemptive protection of that
Act. Indeed, the rule usually is that state and federal courts do not
have jurisdiction over suits involving activity which "is arguably
subject to [section] 7 or [section] 8 of the [NLRA]." 2 However,
Section 7 does not give employees the right to engage in unlawful
conduct.73 In addition, the NLRA and RICO do not target the same
areas of congressional concern.74 The NLRA was not enacted with
the goal of eliminating or preventing organized crime from finding,
taking, and controlling labor unions.75 Conversely, a civil RICO action is not brought to simply invalidate a union election or alter a
collective bargaining agreement or relationship. 6
However, one must question whether the use of civil RICO does
have that unintended adverse effect upon rank-in-file elections, collective bargaining agreements, and collective bargaining relationships. In
fact the gains for employers who bring successful civil RICO actions
against their collective bargaining partner or other labor union, rather
than utilizing the procedures Congress has already provided, are multiple. The employer will be entitled to treble damages and attorney's
fees. In addition, the labor union will have to absorb its own litigation expenses. Both of these factors will weaken the union financially.
Furthermore, this demonstrates to the rank-in-file union members their
relative weakness in the collective bargaining relationship, and undoubtedly affects the overall morale of the labor organization negatively. At the same time, such a civil RICO action greatly enhances
the employer's position in its bargaining relationship with the labor
union.
4. Taft-Hartley Act
The purpose behind the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, also known as
the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), was to readjust the
balance between employers and labor organizations which had originally been created by the NLRA in 1935.' Congress wanted to pro-

72.
unions
(1988)
73.
(1953).
74.
75.
76.
77.
It

San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959) (picketing by
is arguably within the scope of the NLRB's jurisdiction). See 29 U.S.C. §§ 154-156
(creating the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") which oversees the NLRA).
See NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW (Jefferson Standard Broadcasting), 346 U.S. 464
Mastro, supra note
Mastro, supra note
Mastro, supra note
The stated purpose
is the purpose and

2, at 620-23.
2, at 620-23.
2, at 620-23.
of the Taft-Hartley Act is:
policy of this [Act], in order to promote the full flow of
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tect the rights of employees while at the same time allowing for the
free flow of commerce.78 A violation of the Taft-Hartley Act by a
union official can constitute a predicate act for the purpose of forging
a pattern of racketeering activity in a RICO action. 9 In United States
v. Scotto,"o the defendants, Anthony M. Scotto and Anthony
Anastasio, were the president and executive vice president of International Longshoremen's Association Local 1814."' The defendants
were charged with thirty-five violations of the Taft-Hartley Act, specifically, demanding and receiving unlawful labor payments." In reviewing the defendants' appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that
while the illegal payments were not specifically covered under
Taft-Hartley's bribery section," they were still predicate acts because
RICO's definition of racketeering activity reached every part of Section 186, including Section 186(c). 4 Thus, violations of Section
186(c) are sufficient predicate acts for the purposes of RICO.
5. Landrum-Griffin Act
The Landrum-Griffin Act, also known as the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA") of 1959, was specifically

designed to prevent financial and other corruption within unions and
to guarantee the internal rights of union members." However, the
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in
their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for
preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the right of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations
whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of
labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general
welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes
affecting commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1988).
78. Id.
79. United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding a violation of the
Taft-Hartley Act section prohibiting receipt of payments, loans, money or other things of
value from employers by employees to be representative of a predicate act under RICO), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981); United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 618 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 (1983). Among the alleged acts of the accused union officials
were violations of § 302 the Taft-Hartley Act. Id.
80. 641 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981).
81. Id. at 50.
82. Id. Scotto and Anastasio had collected over $250,000 in unlawful labor payments. Id.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1988).
84. Additionally, the Second Circuit concluded that the trial court properly instructed the
jury on RICO's element of conduct of the enterprise; that if the trial court erred, the error
was in favor of the defendants, and that there was no misjoinder of defendants. United States
v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 617-18 (2d Cir. 1982).
85. 29 U.S.C. § 401 (1988) provides standards for labor-management relations and pro-
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Landrum-Griffin Act was directed exclusively at labor unions. It was

Congress' perception that inadequate democracy was the core reason
for corruption in labor unions and that through increased union democracy corruption could be eliminated.86 Toward that end, a bill of

rights of union members was incorporated into Landrum-Griffin. '
Secret ballot election procedures were also required."

Additionally,

strict financial reporting requirements were imposed upon the labor
organization, such as reporting to its members and to the United

States Secretary of Labor.89 A violation of the Landrum-Griffin Act
by a union official can constitute a predicate act for the purposes of

RICO. In United States v. LeRoy,' the government brought criminal
RICO charges against union officials resulting from a Department of
Justice investigation of Laborers International Union, Local 214.
Among the predicate acts committed was the embezzlement of labor
union funds in violation of the Landrum-Griffin Act.

The shortcoming of the Landrum-Griffin Act is that for civil and
criminal actions, the remedies must be sought on a case-by-case basis.9' Furthermore, for union members to exercise their rights, they
must first exhaust the internal appeal procedure that their labor union
supplies. 9 2 Conversely, RICO bypasses Landrum-Griffin's
case-by-case approach.93 Consequently, the Department of Justice's
challenge to the Teamsters may have been a reflection of its impa-

tience with Landrum-Griffin's effectiveness or the way the Department of Labor pursued such actions.'

Indeed, prior to the Justice

Department filing a RICO claim against the Teamsters,'

the D.C.

Circuit in Theodus v. McLaughlin" affirmed a Department of Labor

vides for the protection of rights of employees and public. See Mangum, supra note 35, at
100.
86. Mangum, supra note 35, at 100.
87. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1988).
88. Mangum, supra note 35, at 100. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 481(a)-(c) (elections held not less
than three years for local office, four years for intermediate bodies and five years for national
office); see also Theodus v. McLaughlin, 852 F.2d 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
89. 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-441. See Mangum, supra note 35, at 100.
90. United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174
(1983).
91. Mangum, supra note 35, at 100.
92. Mangum, supra note 35, at 100.
93. Mangum, supra note 35, at 100.
94. Mangum, supra note 35, at 100. See also Theodus v. McLaughlin, 852 F.2d 1380
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
95. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
96. 852 F.2d 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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finding that the automatic selection process of local union officers as
ex officio delegates to the Teamsters' national convention did not
violate the LMRDA.97 Before the government's civil RICO suit
against the Teamsters, no union member within the organization had
succeeded in bringing about union election reform.98
III.

THE GOVERNMENT'S USE OF CIVIL RICO

After cases such as Scotto and LeRoy, prosecutors have taken a
quantum leap in their approach to organized crime's infiltration of
labor unions and to labor racketeering, truly taking RICO to its furthest possible conceptual point. These prosecutors use RICO to replace duly elected union officials with RICO trustees who oversee
elections, investigate charges, discipline union members, and review
expenditures and contracts. Because of the size of the Teamsters
union and the operational commitments the Teamsters maintain
throughout the country, the having a trusteeship emplaced upon them
is comparable to imposing a RICO trustee on a municipality or a
state.
One can speculate that the material reason for the increase in
civil RICO litigation being brought to judgment after 1985 is the
increase in large awards.' That is, nothing succeeds like success.
Similarly, the same can be said of federal prosecutors' use of civil
RICO over the same time period. After having successfully used
criminal and civil RICO against individual union officials, it was
natural to then utilize civil RICO against local unions. Furthermore,
when RICO proved successful against local unions, it was then expanded to the next logical point, international unions.
Additionally, RICO is a very difficult and complex statute which
many attorneys and judges have had trouble mastering."°° This is
made even more difficult by the continuing problems revolving
around RICO's interpretation."0 ' Consequently, one can interpret the

97. Id. at 1384. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
98. Mangum, supra note 35, at 100. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
99. Samuel J. Buffone & Terrance G. Reed, Defending A Civil RICO Case: Motions,
Defenses, Strategies & Tactics, 155 PLI/Crim 323 (1990). See also Ian Lyngklip, Note, RICO
and Environmental Harms from Hazardous Substances, 69 U. DsT. MERCY L. REv. 255

(1922). In 1985, the Supreme Court decided Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, in
which the Court relaxed RICO's burden of proof and requirements, thus causing the doors of
the federal courts to be flung wide open to civil RICO litigation. Lyngklip, supra, at 256.
100. To do so has been called "truly Herculean." Buffone & Reed, supra note 99.
101. Buffone & Reed, supra note 99. See Yolanda Eleni Stefanou, Concurrent Jurisdiction
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government's utilization of RICO, first against union officials, then

against local unions, and finally against international unions, as an
experience in progressive learning.
A. RICO'S Slow Start, a la Scotto
In the beginning, the application of RICO was not of unprecedented scope."

Rather, RICO was used on select individuals in la-

bor organizations where the labor organization was considered the
enterprise. 3 A clear example of this is demonstrated in Scotto,
where the call for a RICO trustee was absent despite the fact that the
defendants, Anthony M. Scotto and Anthony Anastasio, were the
president and executive vice president of International

Longshoremen's Association Local
s

0
18 14 ."

The application of RICO

was straightforward." Scotto was a person under RICO. Scotto was

employed as the labor organization's president and the labor union
was considered an enterprise. Specifically, ILA Local 1814 met the

"affecting commerce" elements of RICO's jurisdiction requirement.
The pattern of racketeering prerequisite was satisfied when there was
a finding of at least two predicate acts within the appropriate time
span and of a nexus between those acts and the racketeering activity.

Over Federal Civil RICO Claims: Is It Workable? An Analysis of Tafflin v. Levitt, 64 ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 877 (1990) (discussing the problems of concurrent jurisdiction and civil RICO interpretation). Ms. Stefanou stresses the need for uniform interpretation of civil RICO,
which already has an "extreme and wide disparity of case law in determining issues of pattern, enterprise, and injury," and whose concurrent jurisdiction will only further compound the
problems of its interpretation. Id. at 892-93. Furthermore, she questions the Supreme Court's
Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990), decision because it fails to reflect the reasonable intent
of Congress to have all of RICO's sections utilized together to effectuate its purpose. Id.
However, she does not even touch upon the Supreme Court's holding that RICO should be
"liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473
U.S. 479, 494-95 (1985). Also, Stefanou stresses the need for the expertise of federal judges
because "the vast number of enumerated acts in the statute are federal crimes involving extremely specialized areas of the law." Stefanou, supra, at 892-93. However, she gives no
weight to the fact that state criminal laws qualify as predicate acts for the purposes of RICO.
See Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc., 530 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1988). The New York
Court of Appeals stated that "there is little difference between State Judges interpreting Federal criminal law if the predicate act alleged is a Federal law violation and the Federal Judges
interpreting State criminal law if the predicate act alleged is a State law violation." Id. at
865.
102. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Indeed, RICO was "[liargely ignored at
first .... " Blakey & Gettings, supra note 33, at 1011.
103. See supra notes 80-84, 90 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
105. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 7, at 362-65.
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Such a nexus was not difficult to establish. The first nexus related to
the numerous kickback and fraud violations which evidenced the
existence of Scotto's organizational plan, and the second nexus involved Scotto's enlistment of other union members to assist him in
this ongoing pattern of racketeering activity.
B.

Trusteeships, RICO and Otherwise

The concept and actual placing of a union in the hands of a

trustee is not new.' Indeed, courts were willing as early as the
1930s to use their equitable powers to identify union members' interests and assist them in partaking in matters of their union."' Those

courts were motivated to move against the corruption that dominated
local unions, which parallels much of the reasoning underlying the
enactment of RICO by Congress in 19 7 0." The congressional con-

cerns which RICO was specifically aimed at were the taking over of
legitimate businesses and unions by organized crime.'" However,
even in the 1930s, the imposition of a trustee upon the labor union
was "considered a 'drastic form' of judicial intervention.""0 Indeed,
courts used self-restraint and caution because such interference into
the internal affairs of a union would give the perception that the

union could not "properly function while in receivership."''.

Thus,

such a drastic remedy was imposed in only the most extreme cases.
The RICO trustee, like the trustee of the 1930s, is seen by the
government as an "extraordinary weapon" that has been used "very
sparingly."".2 This "extraordinary weapon" has been used only where

106. Eric Ames Tilles, Union Receivership Under RICO: A Union Democracy Perspective,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 951-52 (1989).
107. Tilles, supra note 106, at 951-952.
108. Tilles, supra note 106, at 951 n.164. In Collins v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 182 A. 37 (N.J. Ch. 1935). The New Jersey court stated that the real
issue was
whether the inherent right of the individual to work out his own destiny, declared
by the Constitution to be unalienable, shall be preserved . . . . There can be but
one answer to this issue. Once it is thoroughly understood, the rank and file of
labor will revolt against the assumed dictatorship of so-called labor leaders and the
racketeering business agents and resume their right to individual effort and insist
on the freedom of contract which is guaranteed them by the basic law of the land.
Union labor may purge itself.
Id.
109. Mastro, supra note 2, at 574-75.
110. Tilles, supra note 106, at 951.
111. Tilles, supra note 106, at 951 (footnote omitted).
112. Mastro, supra note 2, at 573.
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unions have been "plagued by 'systemic corruption' for 'so many
years' that a drastic remedy was necessary."".

However, there is

nothing in RICO's statutory language that specifically authorizes the
court to remove from office those individuals who were duly elected
union officers or to transfer authority from those union officials to a

federal trustee."4 Despite the absence of specific authority, the Justice Department directs courts to the "not limited to" language of

RICO to find such authority." 5 The Justice Department may ask the
court for such an equitable remedy from the start of the action and,

"pending final determination thereof, the court may at any time enter

such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions...
'6
as it shall deem proper.""
There have been at least three situations where courts have
deemed it proper to call for a RICO trustee. The most clear cut situa-

tion is when the labor union is controlled by organized crime.'

In

another situation, a RICO trustee was put in place for the ad-

vancement of union democracy." 8 Lastly, in at least one instance, a
RICO trustee was put in place for public safety."9
However undesirable the RICO trusteeship may appear to the

concept of union democracy, government intervention is felt to be
needed.'" RICO provides a flexible answer to the complex problem

of labor racketeering, because RICO takes into account the extent of

113. Mastro, supra note 2. at 573 (footnote omitted).
114. Mangum, supra note 35, at 102.
115. Mangum, supra note 35, at 102 (noting that this language only remotely supports
such action). Section 1964(a) provides in pertinent part:
The district courts . . . shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of
section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in
any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on future activities . . . including
but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in . . . or ordering dissolution or reorganization
of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (emphasis added).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (emphasis added); see Mastro, supra note 2, at 572-73. See
also supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
117. See United States v. Local 6A, Cement & Concrete Workers, 663 F. Supp. 192
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279
(D.NJ. 1984), affid, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
118. Kenneth R. Wallentine, A Leash Upon Labor: RICO Trusteeships on Labor Unions,
7 HoFSTRA LAB. LJ. 341, 346 (1990); see Mangum, supra note 35, at 100.
119. United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, 686 F. Supp.
1139 (E.D. Pa. 1988), appeal dismissed, 871 F.2d 401 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 953
(1989).
120. Tilles, supra note 106, at 932.
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intimidation that corrupt union leaders inflict on both union members
and employers, so that these union members and employers will not
feel safe asserting their statutory rights."' RICO also takes into account the inefficiencies of investigating, solving, and prosecuting
isolated crimes." However, there are some clear lines where the
imposition of a RICO trustee upon a labor union should not be used
as a remedy.1" A trustee should not be imposed simply to remove
officers or to end corruption and abuse of powers." A RICO civil
action is not initiated to brush aside election results or to change the

collective bargaining relationship or the collective bargaining agreement."z A RICO trustee should only be utilized to reestablish an
effective union democracy."

C. The Provenzano Group, the Genovese Cosa Nostra Family
and the Boys of Local 560
The concept of a labor union trustee entered a new era in 1986

when Judge Harold Ackerman imposed a RICO trustee over Teamsters Local 560Y' Indeed, the judge's description of Local 560 as
"not a pretty story" was an understatement. Local 560 had been
described as the "textbook example of the creation and use of a cli'
mate of fear and intimidation to extort union members' rights."'

This climate was exemplified by the murders of Anthony Castellitto
in 1961 and Walter Glockner in 1963, and by union members who

opposed Anthony "Tony Pro" Provenzano and spoke out publicly in

121. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 7, at 365; Tilles, supra note 106, at 932.
122. Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 7, at 365.
123. See Clyde W. Summers, Union Trusteeships and Union Democracy, 24 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 689, 695 (1991). Professor Summers states:
[A] trusteeship should not be imposed except where it is clear that corrupt and
abusive leadership has obtained such a stranglehold that members no longer have
the possibility of removing the officers, ending the corruption, and deciding upon
policies through the democratic process.
Id.
124. Summers, supra note 123, at 695.
125. Mastro, supra note 2, at 620.
126. See Summers, supra note 123, at 695.
127. Michael J. Goldberg, Cleaning Labor's House: Institutional Reform Litigation In The
Labor Movement, 824 DUKE LJ. 902, 965 (1989).
128. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279, 282 (D.N.J.
1984), afftd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986). The government alleged that members of the Provenzano group had associations with the Genovese
Crime Family. Id. at 285.
129. Mastro, supra note 2, at 601.
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that regard. 3 However, even if the record taken as a whole could
not support the fact that the Provenzano group had these union members killed, despite using the preponderance of the evidence standard,
the record supported the finding that the Provenzano group did utilize
the perception that it had these individuals killed to intimidate, instill
fear, and quash any opposition to the union.' Besides coercing the
union membership into giving up their guaranteed rights under federal
labor law, the Provenzano Group carried on almost every labor racketeering act known.'
The government had indicted, convicted and sentenced Anthony
Provenzano on prior occasions. He was indicted in 1960 for Hobbs
Act extortion and in 1975 for conspiracy to violate an anti-kickback
statute.'
Anthony Provenzano and four others were indicted and
convicted on criminal RICO charges stemming from labor peace
payoffs. 3" However, even while serving a twenty-two year prison
sentence, Anthony Provenzano was able to influence Local 560
through family members and friends.'35 Clearly the government's intent in bringing a civil RICO action was to once and for all sever the
Provenzano group from Local 560 and its pension funds, and to halt
the injuries to Local 560 members and others who had collective
bargaining relationships with Local 560.
The government alleged that Local 560 was an enterprise within
the meaning of Section 1961(4).136 The government alleged that the
individual defendants were associated together under the leadership of
Anthony Provenzano, that they were aided and abetted by past and
present members of the executive board of Local 560, and that they
conspired in violation of Section 1962(d) to violate Sections 1962(b)
and (c). 37 That is, that the Provenzano group and the executive
board
unlawfully acquired and maintained, directly and indirectly, an interest in and control of the Local 560 Enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity in violation of § 1962(b) of the RICO Act.

130. Local
131. Local
132. Id. at
133. Local
134. Id. at
135. Id. at
board. Id.
136. Id. at
137. Id. at

560, 581 F. Supp. at 312. See also Mastro, supra note 2, at 601-02.
560, 581 F. Supp. at 312.
283-92; see Goldberg, supra note 127, at 965-66.
560, 581 F. Supp. at 289-90.
290 (citing United States v. Provenzano, 605 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1979)).
283-92. Some of the Provenzano Group had been appointed to the executive
283.
283-84. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
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This racketeering activity was alleged to have involved murder and
the systematic use of extortion, with the latter allegedly consisting
of, according to the complaint, "the wrongful use of actual and
threatened force, violence and fear of physical and economic injury
in order to create within Local 560 a climate of intimidation which
induced the members thereof to consent to the surrender of certain
valuable property in the form of their union rights as guaranteed by
the provisions of [the Taft-Hartley Act].' ' 3
The government presented a very strong and compelling case
built around many of the prior violations and convictions of the individual defendants that served as predicate acts for the purposes of
RICO.'39 Thus, it came as no surprise that Judge Ackerman ruled
that because the Executive Board members were either unwilling or
unable to objectively evaluate the criminal conduct of their fellow
members, all the members of the Executive Board should be removed
as a condition precedent to restoring union democracy."
Judge Ackerman selected Joel R. Jacobson, a long time friend
and twenty-five year veteran of the labor movement, to be the RICO
trustee of Local 560.'4' Jacobson was given a court order stating
that he had all the authority and power to act as he saw fit to administer Local 560 and to create and maintain conditions in which a
freely supervised election could be held, supposedly within the first
eighteen months of the RICO trusteeship.' Jacobson had complete
control over the Local's organization, collective bargaining, grievance
procedure, hiring and firing of staff, and expenditures from the
Local's treasury. 43 However, it took Jacobson over six months to
replace the seven paid business agents, and he refused to replace the
400 unpaid shop stewards who apparently effectively assisted in carrying out the union's collective bargaining with over 300 employers.'" Jacobson felt that the cost of replacing the shop stewards
would be too great and that it would be inconsistent to remove duly
elected shop stewards without showing individual misconduct. "
However, due to the evidence, it was clear to Judge Ackerman that
these shop stewards were loyal to the Provenzano group and that they

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Local 560, 581 F. Supp. at 284.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 321.
Goldberg, supra note 127, at 967.
Local 560, 581 F. Supp. at 337.
Goldberg, supra note 127, at 967.
Goldberg, supra note 127, at 968.
Goldberg, supra note 127, at 968.
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would continue to be so." Local 560's former president, Michael
Sciarra, continued his attempt to assert de facto control over the
union until finally being permanently enjoined from further participation in union affairs in 1991."47 This under-estimation by the trustee
resulted in the "Teamsters for Liberty" campaign lead by Sciarra and
Joseph Sheridan, a former vice president of Local 560."~ Both
Sciarra and Sheridan were counting down the number of months to
the forthcoming election.
Under these circumstances, Judge Ackerman replaced the "union
man," Jacobson, with a "cop," the former Assistant United States
Attorney and Director of the New Jersey State Division of Criminal
Justice, Edwin H. Stier, and the election was then pushed back an
additional year, to at least 1988.1" 9 Shortly before the 1988 elections,
Sciarra and Sherdian were enjoined from running in the elections."s°
However, before the government was able to permanently enjoin Michael Sciarra from Local 560 activity, he was able to get his brother,
Danny, to run to for president in the 1988 election. Danny's campaign was successful, thereby enabling Michael Sciarra to return as a
business agent, where he was once again able to exercise control.'
Some people point out that the second time Michael Sciarra was
on the Executive Board there was a distinct break with the past because the rank-and-file rejected contracts he had negotiated, and because the shop stewards made demands and registered complaints
with executive officers, neither of which occurred before the RICO
trusteeship.'
Therefore, the Local 560 trustee should not be declared a failure because conditions were clearly better after the RICO
trusteeship than before it.'

146. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 969.
147. See United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 754 F. Supp. 395 (D.NJ.
1991), order aftid, 974 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1992).
148. See Wallentine, supra note 118, at 360-62; Goldberg, supra note 127, at 969-70.
149. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 971.

150. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 694 F. Supp. 1158 (D.NJ.
1988) (defendants arguing that they should not be barred because neither had ever been con-

victed of a crime).
151. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 972-73; Wallentine, supra note 118, at 362-63. However, the government was granted a permanent injunction against Michael Sciarra prohibiting his
further participation in the affairs of Local 560 in January 1991. United States v. Local 560,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 754 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.J. 1991), order affid, 974 F.2d 315 (3d Cir.

1992).
152.

Wallentine, supra note 118, at 361-62.

153. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 974.
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The Columbo Crime Family and Cement: If They're So Bad,
Why Only a Limited Trusteeship?

During the summer of 1986, Local 6A, Cement and Concrete
Workers, Laborers International Union of North America ("Local
6A") represented approximately 1400 members, while the District
Council represented nearly 4000 members.'"4 Unfortunately, the president of the District Council two years earlier was Ralph Scopo, an
allegedly "made" member of the Columbo Crime Family. 5 Another
bad turn for Local 6A was that this was the time of the Cement
Workers litigation." It was under these circumstances that the government brought a civil RICO action against Local 6A including a
request for preliminary relief in the form of a trustee. 7 However,
the union defendants argued that there had been no wrong-doing since
Ralph Scopo had been removed from office back in 1984, and that
the call for injunctive relief was untimely. 8
In addition, the government argued that the Local 560 case was
factually comparable, except that there had been no comprehensible
criminal RICO claim against the twenty-five union officers individually named as defendants in the complaint.'59 Despite the
government's pleas, the court scheduled an evidentiary hearing to
allow the union an opportunity to bring to the court's attention any
evidence that might be relevant to the court's ruling.'"Subsequent to
the evidentiary hearing the government and the union entered a consent judgment where a trustee would be appointed to oversee the
operations of Local 6A for four years.' Additionally, the consent
judgment barred some individual defendants from holding union office, and under certain instances, from ever being a laborer in the
union."
However, Local 6A's trustee was not a full trustee. The trustee,
Eugene R. Anderson, was limited, analogous to the role of an advi-

154.

Goldberg, supra note 127, at 975.

155.

United States v. Local 6A, Cement & Concrete Workers, 663 F. Supp. 192, 193

(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
156. See Goldberg, supra note 127, at 975.
157. Local 6A, 663 F. Supp. at 193.
158. Id. at 195-96.

159. Id.
160. Id. at 196-97.
161. Mastro, supra note 2, at 581.
162. Mastro, supra note 2, at 581.
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sor.'" Anderson did not oversee daily union affairs and many of the
former union leaders were allowed to retain their positions."6 Only
sixteen of the twenty-five local and joint council officers resigned
their positions." This relates directly to the overall strengths and
weaknesses of the government's case, especially because the government premised its case by stating that Local 6A was comparable to
Local 560.
The Local 6A trustee did, however, have "specific authority to
remove union officers, business agents, and shop stewards for acts of
racketeering or malfeasance, or for knowingly associating with La
Cosa Nostra members, and to veto any contracts or expenditures constituting or furthering acts of racketeering or malfeasance."'" In addition, the trustee also had authority to oversee union elections."
An irony in the Local 6A litigation was that because so much of the
union's funds were spent on the union's defense of the action, very
little was left for investigatory purposes." Furthermore, Anderson's
pessimistic view that Local 6A would revert back to its old ways
after the trusteeship lends to the overall appearance that the Local 6A
trusteeship was a failure."6
E. The Teamsters
Daniel Webster once said that "[labor is independent and
proud."' 7 But what happens when labor is neither independent nor
proud? What happens when members of a labor union become aware
that their leadership has made a "devil's pact with La Cosa
Nostra' 7' and are unable to rid themselves of those leaders through
the election procedures already in place? Indeed, from 1976 until
1987, the Teamsters for a Democratic Union ("TDU") had been trying without success to "tak[e] matters into their own hands to reform
'
their union. ' I71

163. Wallentine, supra note 118, at 362-63.
164. Wallentine, supra note 118, at 362-63.
165. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 975.
166. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 976.
167. Wallentine, supra note 118, at 363.
168. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 976.
169. Wallentine, supra note 118, at 363.
170. Speech of Daniel Webster (Apr. 2, 1824), in THE GREAT THOUGHTS 442 (George
Seldes ed., 1st ed. 1985).
171. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 995 (quoting from the government's complaint against

the IBT).
172.

Ken Paff, Insight -

Let the Teamsters Vote; We Need Union Democracy, Not a
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1. Setting Up the Teamsters
On June 28, 1988, the government filed a civil RICO suit

against the Teamsters," which represented "the boldest step taken
under RICO in the labor arena, and perhaps the boldest step taken
under RICO in any context." 74 The government once again argued
as it had in Local 560 that the union was contaminated by organized
crime'75 and that the organized crime elements had gone so far as to
engineer the IBT presidential elections of Roy Williams and Jackie
Presser.'76 The government also alleged that top union officers had
continuously aided and abetted organized crime at every possible
opportunity.'" Because of the numerous allegations, many of which

had been presented and proven in prior cases, the government sought
immediate preliminary injunctive relief in the form of a pendente lite
court liaison officer.'78 Judge Edelstein properly concluded that such
an action would be improper without first having an evidentiary hearing, however, he did agree to an expedited consolidated trial on the
merits.'"

2.

Settling the Teamsters

On the eve of the expedited trial, the Teamsters and the government settled the action and entered into a consent decree.' The

Government Takeover, WASH. POST, June 21, 1989, at B5 (expressing the TDU view that
reform lies in the UAW 1972 Department of Labor example of supervised
one-member/one-vote elections and not with the possible restructuring RICO would provide).
See also Collins v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 182 A. 37 (NJ. Ch.
1935). "The ultimate solution of corrupt union officials lays with labor's rank-in-file." Id. at
44.
173. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y.

1989).
174. Wallentine, supra note 118, at 359.
175. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 995.
176. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 995. See also George Kannar, Making the Teamsters
Safe for Democracy, 102 YALE LJ. 1645 (1993). However, long before this time, the public
was aware of the Teamsters' criminal connections. Id. at 1646.
177. Kannar, supra note 176. at 1646. See also Frank Swoboda, Prosecutor Defends Suit
Against Union; Teamsters' Lawyer Denounces 'Abuse', WASH. POST, June 30, 1988, at A6.
Former United States Attorney Rudolph Giuliani, in defending the government suit against the
Teamsters, stated that "[t]here have been over 300 people convicted .... But you can prosecute forever and you can't remove the influence of the Mafia from the Teamsters without
having the use of the civil RICO statute." Id.
178. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 995.
179. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 996.
180. United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y.
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government's principal concession allowed individual defendants to
remain in office until the 1991 elections and in return, the Teamsters
agreed to reorganize the IBT governing structure and election process. 8 ' In addition, three court officers were appointed to oversee
the unions: an administrator, an investigations officer, and an elections
officer." The administrator was to share power equally with the
Teamsters' president." The administrator was also given the power
of the General Executive Board, within the scope of the IBT constitution, to remove from office, expel, or otherwise discipline corrupt
officers and members. Furthermore, the administrator was also given
the power to impose intra-union trusteeships over corrupt affiliates,
and to review and veto IBT expenditures, appointments, or agreements, outside of collective bargaining agreements that appeared to
further acts of racketeering or cultivate union association with organized crime." The investigative officer was given even broader
powers to investigate corruption within the unions and to press disciplinary charges against violators." Finally, the election officer was
given authority to oversee the election process, culminating in the
Teamsters' first direct, secret ballot election for national office in
1991.1' This Independent Review Board was to serve until 1992, at
which time the Teamsters were to have established a permanent Independent Review Board.'
3.

Sorting Out the Teamsters

The structural changes that the IBT instituted in response to the
consent order have been cited as the most important changes affecting
the IBT. Indeed, its national election, which took place in 1991,
was an important change, "transform[ing] the Teamsters from the
most corrupt [union] to one of the most democratic unions in America.' 89

1989). See also Goldberg, supra note 127, at 996.
181. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 996.
182. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 996.
183. Wallentine, supra note 118, at 360.
184. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 996-97.
185. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 996-97.
186. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 997.
187. Mastro, supra note 2, at 583.
188. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 997; see also United States v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, No. 88 Civ. 4486, 1992 WL 212638, at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1992).
189. Frank Swoboda, The Teamsters' New Face: Judge Leads Army of Federal Monitors
to Union Convention to Keep Reforms on Track, WASH. POST, June 23, 1991, at HI. "Only
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However, clearly as important and far reaching were the changes
that came at the hands of the administrator and the investigative
officer. As of August 21, 1992, together they have filed charges
against 185 individuals and three locals, conducted at least seventythree hearings on disciplinary charges, imposed at least nine trusteeships, and decided over 250 appeals." Also, because the Teamsters
were to have established a permanent Independent Review Board in
1992, these internal changes would be an ongoing process.
IV.

ONCE THE GOVERNMENT'S TRUSTEE IS IN PLACE,
WHO PAYS FOR THIS WHITE KNIGHT?

Once the RICO trusteeship is ordered into place by the court, the
question arises, who will pay for it? The labor organization argues
that the government should pay the trustee's wages and costs because
the government persuaded the court to appoint him. The government
argues that the labor organization should pay since its members are
benefitting. They see it as the price for having democracy and their
rights restored.
In United States v. Ianniello,19' the government was successful
in placing a temporary RICO trustee at Umberto's Clam House prior
to the full hearing." However, when the government wanted the
trustee to be paid out of corporate funds, the defendant refused. 3
The Second Circuit decided to test the purpose of the trustee by
determining who actually benefited from the trustee's emplacement."M In this case, the purpose was to prevent the continued skimming from Umberto's profits which helped to avoid the payment of
taxes.s Thus, since the trustee would have increased the taxes paid

four other unions have direct rank and file elections of national officers." Id. However, "this
seemingly sweeping victory may have been less impressive than it appeared. Overall voter
turnout was a depressing twenty-eight percent. Pre-election polls suggested that almost a quarter of the members were still too intimidated or cynical to vote .
Kannar, supra note
176, at 1649 (footnotes omitted).
190. See United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, No. 88 Civ. 4486, 1992 WL
212638, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1992).
191. 824 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1987).
192. See United States v. lanniello, 824 F.2d 203, 205 (2d Cir. 1987); Gerald MeKelvey
& TJ. Collins, How Law Has Been Used to Clip Mob, NEWSDAY, Aug. 27, 1987, at 3. The

government had taken over to prevent the continued skimming of millions of dollars from the
restaurant where mobster Joey Gallo was publicly murdered. Id.
193. lanniello, 824 F.2d at 205.
194. Id. at 209.
195. Id. at 205, 209. This civil litigation was brought on the heels of the criminal con-
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to the government and the public would have benefited."9 However,
if at a later time the government could establish that Umberto's benefited from the receivership as a corporation, it might then be appropriate to reimburse the government for some or all of the receiver's
expenses.'"

The federal courts have agreed with the government's position
that union members benefit from the emplacement of a RICO trustee.

Indeed, in the case of Local 560, the trustee's fees were charged to
the union and not the government.' There, the court found that it
had authority to direct the union to pay under Section 1964(a) of the
statute because "RICO is to be read broadly," as contemplated by
both the Supreme Court"9 and Congress, and this broad reading is

consistent with RICO's remedial purposes.
In addition to the court order, parties to a consent decree can
agree during the course of negotiations who will bear the cost of the
trustee. The consent order entered into by the government and the
Teamsters called for all expenses and costs of implementing the consent order to be paid by the union.'
V.

RICO IN PRIVATE HANDS

The government, having established most of the ground rules for
criminal and civil RICO actions against labor organizations, has left a
well marked path for private actions against labor organizations.2' It
is against that backdrop that Randy M. Mastro made a sales pitch to
the private sector.

victions of Alfred and Matthew lanniello.
196. Id. at 209.
197. Id.
198. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 731 F. Supp. 1206, 1207-09
(D.NJ. 1990).
199. Id. at 1208. Additionally, in the case of Local 560, the court rejected the union's
argument that it could not afford to pay the fees because the union had not put forth any
specific evidence that it could not make the payment for the trustee. Id. at 1209. The court
also found that the fee of $150 per hour was reasonable and necessary for the services the
trustee provided. Id.
200. Goldberg, supra note 127, at 999 (citing the Teamsters' consent order).
201. RICO's legislative history yields scant evidence regarding private civil RICO remedies. Victoria G. T. Bassetti, Note, Weeding RICO Out of Garden Variety Labor Disputes, 92
CoLuJM. L. REv. 103, 156 (1992). "A review of the congressional debates reveals absolutely
no reference whatsoever to private civil RICO and labor disputes." Id. (citing to Organized
Crime Control: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 89, 96, 106 (1970) (statement of Rep. Steiger)).
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Mastro: "You Too Can Sue a Union"

During the summer of 1991, Mastro, a former Assistant United
States Attorney and Deputy Chief of the Civil Division of the Office
of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York,
wrote an article explaining how the government had successfully
prosecuted civil RICO actions against labor unions to show how
private litigants might use civil RICO actions "to achieve similar
equitable reform of labor unions."' Mastro begins by stating that
the use of equity in civil RICO is an "extraordinary" weapon that has
been used "very sparingly," but the caveat is he seems all too willing
to place in the hands of employers the responsibility to finish the
work the government has begun.) 3 A fitting analogy is that of nuclear proliferation. Here there is an "extraordinary" weapon being
passed out to employers so that they can interfere with the internal
affairs of their adversary collective bargaining partners to achieve
"equitable reform." This would clearly poison the collective bargaining relationship and destroy the balance that has been created between
employers and labor unions.' Taken to its extreme, employers
could embark on their own litigation to emplace a trustee of their
own choice, while making the union pay for the cost of litigation
through the award of attorney fees, treble damages, and payment of
the trustee.
However, for all the incentives mentioned by Mastro, such as
treble damages and attorney fees, there are some precautions given on
RICO's use.' The jurisdictional cautions which are given address
the split present in the circuit courts regarding whether private litigants can obtain equitable relief under RICO.' In the end, however,
Mastro's position is clear. RICO on its face allows any litigant to
seek equitable relief because Section 1964(a) does not mention any
limitation on equitable actions brought by private plaintiffs.' In-

202. Mastro, supra note 2, at 571.
203. Mastro, supra note 2, at 573-74.
204. "RICO is a venomous weapon imbued with destructive power and devoid of creative
answers to the problems of industrial conflict." Bassetti, supra note 201, at 164.
205. Mastro, supra note 2, at 635-36.
206. Compare Religious Technology Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding injunctive relief to be unavailable to private civil Rico Plaintiffs), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1103 (1987) with Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that injunctive relief may be available).
207. Mastro, supra note 2, at 636.
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deed, Mastro argues that the inclusion of the government in that section of the statute was only to ensure that the government had standing to seek relief.' Despite the fact that Congress had failed to
pass an earlier version of RICO that had specific language expressly

authorizing equitable relief for private litigants, Mastro firmly believes
that there was no reason for Congress to include such a section "because the statutory language already clearly granted that authority

129

B.

The Federal Circuits' Split Regarding

Private Use of RICO's Equitable Power
The question of whether or not civil RICO allows private plain-

tiffs injunctive relief has produced a lot of disagreement amongst the
courts."' This apparent schism has its roots in the civil remedy section of the RICO statute."' Section 1964(a) grants the courts broad
remedial powers, Section 1964(b) clearly allows the government to

seek equitable relief, and Section 1964(c) pertains
to private parties
212
and contains no explicit grant of equitable relief.
There is no controlling federal case law on whether or not private plaintiffs are prohibited from seeking equitable relief under civil
RICO. Indeed, in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.," 3 the Second Circuit reviewed the legislative history of Section 1964(c) and concluded
in dicta that it "seems altogether likely that [section] 1964(c) ... was

208. Mastro, supra note 2, at 637.
209. Mastro, supra note 2, at 638-39.
210. See Lincoln House, Inc. v. Dupre, 903 F.2d 845 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that
whether injunctive relief is available or not in a private civil RICO action is an open question); Religious Technology Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
the plain meaning of the words of the statute and the legislative history of the statute clearly
shows that injunctive relief is not available to the private plaintiff), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1103 (1987); Sedima, S.P.RL. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984) (concluding in extended dicta that § 1964(c) was not intended to provide private equitable relief), rev'd on
other grounds, 473 U.S. 479 (1985); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing
Blakey & Gettings. supra note 33), on reh'g, 710 F.2d 1361, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008
(1983); Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. I11. 1983) (holding that the
fair reading of § 1964(c) limits private plaintiffs to treble damages only); Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that nothing in § 1964
indicates that a preliminary injunction would be an inappropriate order for the court to issue),
aid, 730 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984).
211. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964.
212. Id.
213. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
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not intended to provide private parties injunctive relief. '2

4

However,

one must be ever mindful of the Supreme Court's reversal of
Sedima,"5 especially in light of "the Supreme Court's total rejection
of the conclusions drawn by the Second Circuit from its historical
analysis of the RICO statute."21 Therefore, the precedential value of
the Sedima decision is questionable. 7

However, there is persuasive evidence that a plain meaning reading of the statute would not allow private parties to utilize equitable

remedies under RICO. 2'8 The Ninth Circuit found it significant that
"[the language of the treble damages antitrust remedy, section four of
the Clayton Act ... is similar to that of civil RICO. The Supreme
Court has explicitly held that the language of section [four] precludes

private injunctive relief.' 29 The Ninth Circuit went on to note that
under the Clayton Act a separate section has been provided which
explicitly allows private individuals to move for equitable relief and

that RICO provides no such parallel section or provision granting private individuals the right to injunctive relief.' Conversely, Professor
Blakey, the principal draftsman of the RICO statute, indicates that
equitable relief is available to the private plaintiff." However, Pro-

fessor Blakey's opinion that equitable relief is appropriate since there
is no clear statutory limitation has drawn criticisms from those who

feel that this interpretation violates elementary statutory construction.'
Regardless, even if equitable relief were denied to private plaintiffs in civil RICO actions under Section 1964(c), private plaintiffs
could make an argument under Section 1964(a) for the same such

214. Religious Technology Dr., 796 F.2d at 1081.
215. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
216. Religious Technology Ctr., 796 F.2d at 1081.
217. Id. Furthermore, private plaintiffs can argue that Congress expressly wanted to have
RICO "liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Id. at 1083 (quoting Sedima,
473 U.S. at 498). Clearly, its remedial purposes "are nowhere more evident than in the provision of a private action for those injured by racketeering activity." Id. (citing Sedima, 473
U.S 479. and United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981)).
218. See Religious Technology Ctr., 796 F.2d 1076; Town of W. Hartford v. Operation
Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 371 (D. Conn. 1989), vacated, 915 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1990).
219. Religious Technology Ctr., 796 F.2d at 1087 (emphasis in original).
220. Id.
221. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 33, at 1038 nn.132-33. See also Bennett v. Berg, 685
F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing Professor Blakey), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
222. See, e.g., Kaushal v. State Bank of India, 556 F. Supp. 576 (N. D. II. 1983).
"[C]urrent Supreme Court doctrine sharply limits the implication of rights of action or remedies where Congress has not provided them." Id. at 584. See also Sedima, 741 F.2d 482;
Religious Technology Dr., 796 F.2d 1076.
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equitable relief. Nothing in Section 1964(c) strips the court of its
inherent power to grant equitable relief to prevent irreparable injury
from prohibited conduct under RICO.' Under this rationale, it becomes apparent that the only limits on private plaintiffs' requests for
equitable relief are those limits that are already imposed on the
courts' traditional powers in equity, such as the prohibitions against
injunctive interference against labor organizations set out in the
Norris-LaGuardia Act?. 4
C. Frivolous and Abusive Litigation, or Not?
There has been an explosion of civil RICO litigation. This trend
is also reflected in the field of labor law. Whether this litigation is
largely motivated by the treble damages and attorney fees, or by the
desire to inflict a punitive measure upon one's adversary in a collective bargaining relationship, is unclear. However, it is clear that the
use of civil RICO by either party poisons the collective bargaining
relationship.
1. Attempting to Organize C & W Construction Company
In C & W Construction Co.,' the plaintiffs, C & W Construction Co. ("C & W"), and individual contractors, brought numerous
causes of action against Local 745, including a civil RICO action
stemming from the Local's organization campaign of C & W to obtain a union contract in December 1980.' However, C & W refused to sign. Then, according to the plaintiff, the union's agent
threatened violence and picketing at C & W job sites. 7 The union
continued its quest for recognition into January 1981, at which time
the union started to picket C & W job sites.' In response to the
picketing, C & W asked the NLRB to supervise an election of its
223. See Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Barry, 825 F.2d 1220, 1223-24 (8th Cir. 1987);
Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1540-41 (W.D. Pa. 1984);
Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Vietnamese
Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
224. The clear congressional intent in passing the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to end injunctive interference in labor relations. Tilles, supra note 106, at 931.
225. C & W Constr. Co. v. Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 745, 687 F. Supp. 1453
(D. Haw. 1988).
226. Id. at 1458. The complaint also alleged negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, federal and state antitrust violations, unfair labor practices, and tortious inter-

ference with contracts. Id.
227. Id. at 1457.
228.

Id.
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employees. An election was held in February 1981 and Local 745
lost.' However, Local 745 allegedly continued its picketing despite
the fact that the NLRB sought to have it enjoined.' Indeed, the
picketing did not stop until April 1981." During this time period, C
& W accused the union of preventing deliveries of necessary materials, as well as reaching, influencing, and coercing suppliers who had
contracts with C & W. 2 This caused delays, increased costs and
loss of jobs. ' 3
The court then applied the RICO elements to C & W's allegations.' Here, the person element was directed at the defendants,
both the union and its officers. The plaintiffs pleaded C & W and its
suppliers as the enterprise which had been affected. 5 The court
found that the plaintiffs had not adequately identified the enterprise,
stated whether the enterprise was a continuing operation, nor showed
that the predicate acts served a common purpose. 6 The alleged
predicate acts fell into three categories: obstruction of justice, mail
and wire fraud, and the Hobbs Act violation. 7 The obstruction of
justice stemmed from alleged perjury presented in defendants' affidavits to the district court regarding the NLRB lawsuit." The court
noted that perjury had not been uniformly held to be a predicate act
for the purposes of RICO by federal courts. 9 However, the court
would not conclude that perjury could never be a predicate act for

229. Id.
230. Id.

231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. In its discussion of the RICO claim the court stated:

[A] plaintiff suing under civil RICO must allege:
1. The defendant ("person" in terms of RICO)

2.
3.
4.
5.

through the commission of two or more timely acts (i.e., within 10 years)
constituting a "pattern"
of "racketeering activity"
directly or indirectly invests, maintains and [sic] interest in, or participates in

6. an "enterprise"

7. the activities of which affect interstate (or foreign) commerce
8. "by reason of" which the plaintiff was injured in his business or property.

Id. at 1465.
235. Id. at 1466.
236. Id. at 1470.
237. Id. at 1466.
238. Id.
239. Id. (comparing Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 176 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
alTd. 794 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986), with Von Bulow v. Von
Bulow, 657 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
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the purpose of RICO. Furthermore, the court would not narrow the
interpretation of predicate acts because both the Supreme Court and
the Ninth Circuit had stated that "RICO was to be read broadly."2'
Therefore, perjury would be a predicate act only if it were part of a
larger pattern of racketeering activity.24' However, the court was
quick to dismiss the mail and wire fraud claims because there was no
direct or indirect reference to a misrepresentation, or "no specific
intent to defraud."2' 2 The court found that the union was straightforward and candid with its demands, both to the employers and the
employees.243 However, the court distinguished the activity of Local
745, particularly the threatened violence against C & W job sites,
from protected activity regarding legitimate collective bargaining objectives.2' Consequently, because of the prohibitory nature of the
secondary boycott, the court found that the alleged violations of the
Hobbs Act supported the pattern of racketeering activity requirement.24 In so doing, the court found that the plaintiff's allegations
were satisfied because the prohibited activities affected interstate commerce and resulted in injury.' The RICO claim was dismissed with
leave to file a motion to amend.247
What was clearly omitted from the C & W court's decision, and
its analysis, was any form of investigation into the congressional
intent behind RICO, such as fighting the takeover of legitimate businesses and unions by organized crime.248 The court never connected
the fact that Section 1961 of RICO specifically addresses only two
sections of Title 29 of the United States Code.249 In addition, neither
of the two sections that the court cited"0 were specifically within
RICO's scope and one was not even punitive to the offender outside
of being charged with unfair labor practices under the National Labor

240. Id. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985)).
241.

Id. at 1470.

242. Id. at 1467-68 (quoting Sun Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 195
(9th Cir. 1987)).

243. Id.
244.
245.

Id. at 1468-69.
Id. at 1468-70. The union did not have a contract with C & W, nor was the union

on strike against C & W.
246. Id. at 1470.
247. Id. at 1475. The court dismissed all the claims but two: the federal antitrust claim
and the state claim for tortious interference with contract.
248. Mastro, supra note 2, at 574-75.

249. 29 U.S.C. §§ 186, 501(c); 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(C).
250. See C & W Constr., 687 F. Supp. at 1468-69 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4),

187(b)).
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Relations Act ("NLRA").5
2.

Recognizing Yellow Bus Lines

In the fall of 1981 James Woodward, a business agent for Driv-

ers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639 ("Local 639"), staged a
strike against Yellow Bus Line, Inc. ("Yellow Bus") to gain recognition as its exclusive bargaining partnern52 During the course of this
campaign, both sides accused the other of making threatening remarks 3 and various acts of violence were allegedly committed.'
Finally, Woodward was allegedly arrested without cause. "5 Thus,
amongst the claims of false arrest, alleged violations of constitutional
and statutory rights, and supposed intentional infliction of emotional
distress upon the officers of Yellow Bus, the seemingly endless Yellow Bus Lines litigation was launched.' Eventually, in 1990 the

RICO claims against the union were dismissed by the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals.'
a. Round One: To the Union
Yellow Bus sought treble damages and attorney's fees under civil
RICO from both Woodward and the union." Yellow Bus' complaint initially asserted that both Woodward and Local 639 were

persons under RICO, and that both engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity to further the enterprise's goal of unionizing Yellow

Bus.59 In addition, Yellow Bus pleaded that there were many predicate acts.' ° However, the D.C. District Court found that Local 639

was not a suable "person" but was a non-suable RICO "enterprise." In its careful review of RICO cases, the court was per-

251. The district court found that the secondary boycott activity was clearly illegal. Id.
See also 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (regarding secondary boycott activity).
252. Woodward v. DiPalerno, Civ. A. No. 82-3154, 1984 WL 2915 (D.D.C. June 28,
1984).
253. One such threat was telling the parents of the children who would ride the bus that
the drivers were carrying guns and that the brake lines would be cut. Id. at *5.
254. The tires on six buses were punctured. Id.
255. Id.
256. See Woodward, 1984 WL 2915.
257. Yellow Bus Lines v. Drivers, Local 639, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en bane),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
258. See Woodward, 1984 WL 2915, at *2 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq.).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at *3.
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suaded that the intent of RICO was not to impose civil liability upon
a criminal enterprise, but rather to allow monetary recovery only
against those persons who had participated in the affairs of an enter-

prise through a pattern of racketeering activity.'

Of course, this

does not mean that a union can never be sued in this capacity. A

union engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity in order to assist
an outside criminal organization could, under those circumstances, be

considered a person under RICO.' However, a RICO enterprise can
not simultaneously be a RICO person.' Thus, Local 639 was
viewed as an enterprise and not a person under the presented circum-

stances for civil RICO purposes.'
Subsequent to the filing of its complaint, Yellow Bus realized
this error and sought to amend its complaint, stating that Yellow Bus
was the enterprise and that the strike by Local 639, or those acts that
made up the strike, was committed in the conduct of Yellow Bus'
Alternatively, Yellow Bus argued that Local 639 and
affair.'

Woodward were in fact a RICO enterprise.' However, the court
concluded that Yellow Bus was just the setting for the union's activities and that the amendments came too late to properly defeat the

union's request for summary judgment.'

In addition, among the

predicate acts that Yellow Bus alleged were the unfair labor practices

committed by Local 639 in violation of Section 8(b)(4) of the
NLRA.6 9 Specifically, Local 639's strike of Yellow Bus was a prohibited secondary boycott activity. 7 ' However, the court found that

262. Id. The court never reached the issue of the existence of the qualification of a predicate act.
263. Id.
264. Id. at *4 (citing Rae v. Union Bank, 725 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1984)).
265. Id.
266. Id. at *7.
267. Yellow Bus Lines v. Drivers Local 639, 883 F.2d 132, 140-41 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
"This type of enterprise [an association-in-fact] need not be a legal entity; RICO is directed
at groups of individuals informally organized for a common purpose." Blakey & Gettings,
supra note 33, at 1025. "Associations in fact are often formed for the purposes of engaging
in criminal activities, but their purpose may be legitimate as well." Id. (citing S. REP. No.
617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007). Furthermore,
"Illegitimate associative groups are often enterprises infiltrated in section 1964(b) violations."
Id. at 1025 n.89.
268. Yellow Bus Lines, 883 F.2d at 141.
269. See Woodward v. DiPalermo, Civ. A. No. 82-3154, 1984 WL 2915, at *5 (D.D.C.
June 28, 1984).
270. Id. See supra notes 70-76, 278 and accompanying text. Secondary boycotts caused
by labor union activity are not criminal per se; nor are there any punitive sanctions available
for violating this section of the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
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the violent nature of the activity that took place during the strike did
not transform the acts into secondary boycott activity. 7 Thus, there
was no injury, and the RICO claims were temporarily dismissed. '
b.

Round Two: To the Employer

There came a time when the Supreme Court vacated the earlier
decision and remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit for its "consideration in light of the Court's teaching in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co."' The D.C. Circuit went on to find that the dismissal of the RICO claim and the denial of leave to amend were in error. 4 In reviewing the defendants' conduct, the court found that the
four alleged direct threats to Yellow Bus' property and its employees,
as well as the alleged acts of vandalism and intimidation, all occurred
during a specific time period in pursuit of a single goalY The court
went on to state that if the acts could be proven, they could establish
"a distinct threat of long-term racketeering activity, either explicit or
implicit,"'276 thus apparently fulfilling the pattern requirement of
"continuity plus relationship."'
Subsequent to the District Court
dismissal of Yellow Bus' RICO claims the Supreme Court's Sedima
decision held that RICO "required no allegation of a separate 'racketeering injury,"' 8 therefore, the District Court had erred.
However the D.C. Circuit upheld the lower court's finding that
Local 639 was an "enterprise" and not a "person" under the circumstances, and for the purposes of civil RICO. 79 In addition, the court
also would not allow Yellow Bus to plead its RICO enterprise
"association-in-fact" argument.' Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit did
reject the lower court's overly restrictive interpretation of Section
1962(c), finding the relationship between Local 639 and Yellow Bus
had fallen within the scope of activity contemplated by the statute,
and stating that the business relationship that Local 639 had with
Yellow Bus was "full-fledged ... [and] not merely a 'setting' for

271. See Woodward, 1984 WL 2915, at *5.
272. Id. See infra note 278 and accompanying text.
273. Yellow Bus Lines, 883 F.2d at 134 (referring to HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989)).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 138.
276. Id. at 145.
277. Id. at 144-45.

278. Id. at 139.
279.
280.

Id. at 139-40.
Id. at 140-41.
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crimes otherwise unrelated to [Yellow Bus'] affairs."' " The union's
strike for recognition was activity sufficiently related to Yellow Bus'
ongoing role as an enterprise to establish the requisite nexus.2
Therefore, Yellow Bus was given the opportunity to amend its complaint accordingly and to test its theory.s
c.

Round Three: A Union TKO

Ten years after Woodward started this four day strike against

Yellow Bus for recognition, the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, finally
concluded that a union merely "conducting a recognition strike against
an employer [does not] 'conduct or participate, directly or indirectly,
in the conduct of the employer's affairs within the meaning of section 1962(c)" of RICO.' The court stated that "conduct" was synonymous with "management" or "direction,"'
and because "con-

ducting" connotes more than merely "participating in" affairs, Section
1962(c) applied to a defendant "when a defendant, through a pattern
of racketeering activity, exercises significant control over or within an

enterprise, participating not merely in the enterprise's affairs, but in
the conduct of the enterprise's affairs. '' "s RICO does not intend to

outlaw the commission of all predicate acts, however, RICO does
seek to outlaw the commission of those predicate acts that are a fiat
through which a defendant conducts or participates in the conduct of
an enterprise's affairs.' Otherwise, conducting or participating in
any strike or organizational effort by a labor organization or employ-

281. Id. at 144.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Yellow Bus Lines, 913 F.2d at 948-49.
285. Id. at 954 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 473 (1961)).
286. Id. at 954. Cf Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993). In Reves, the
Supreme Court stated that the word "conduct' required some degree of direction and that the
word "participate" required "some part in that direction" and with that understanding "the
meaning of § 1962(c) comes into focus.' Id. at 1170. Therefore, "[i]n order to 'participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such an enterprise's affairs,' one must have some part
in directing those affairs." Id. However, "the word 'participate' makes clear that RICO liability is not limited to those with primary responsibility for the enterprise's affairs, just as the
phrase 'directly or indirectly' makes clear that RICO liability is not limited to those with a
formal position in the enterprise, but some part in directing the enterprise's affairs is required" Id. (footnote omitted). The "operation or management" test communicates this fundamental condition. Id. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals' recommendation "that § 1962(c) requires 'significant control over or within an enterprise."' Id.
at 1170 n.4.
287. Yellow Bus Lines, 913 F.2d at 955.
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ees would be participating conduct in the affairs of any employer. 88

To apply RICO under those circumstances conflicts with the fundamental tenets of federal labor law, which have been delicately crafted
to balance the interests of labor and management. 9 Quoting the Supreme Court in Hudgens v. NLRB, the "[a]ccommodation between
employees' [NLRA section] 7 rights and employers' property
rights ...

'must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is

consistent with the maintenance of the other."' If Congress wanted
to alter this balance in such a dramatic way, "it would have done so
clearly and unequivocally."" 1 Thus, by striking, Local 639 was acting with interest adverse to Yellow Bus, but was conducting its own
affairs. Consequently, the acts of Local 639 did not "constitute the
sort of hijacking of Yellow Bus, in the form of acquiring and exercising control over Yellow Bus's affairs, that the RICO statute was
designed to combat." 2 Further, the union itself had not lost control
to any person that caused it to engage in the alleged racketeering activity.'
3. Bargaining with Domestic Linen Supply & Laundry
In 1936, the Domestic Linen Supply & Laundry Company ("Domestic") and the Teamsters "established a collective bargaining unit
which included supervisory and managerial employees."' The parameters of the collective bargaining unit changed with the
Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA, in which the statutory definition of "employee" excluded persons employed as supervisors.'"
Although supervisory employees were still free to organize and become members of collective bargaining units, employers were not required to recognize them." A union does not commit an unfair labor practice in proposing that supervisors be included in the collective
bargaining agreement, but employers are within their rights to refuse
to engage in negotiating over supervisors.2' In addition, the NLRB
288.
289.
290.

Id.
Id.
Hudgens v. NLRB. 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976) (quoting NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox

Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956)); see Yellow Bus Lines, 913 F.2d at 955.
291.
292.
293.

Id.
Id. at 956.
Id. (noting that this event would place the individual within the reach of § 1962(c)).

294. Domestic Linen Supply & Laundry Co. v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest
Areas Pension Fund, 722 F. Supp. 1472, 1474 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
295.
296.
297.

Id. at 1475 (referencing 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)).
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 164).
Id. at 1476 (citing Sakrete of N. Cal., Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 902, 908 (9th Cir.
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provides a procedure for unit clarification where the propriety of
supervisors being included within the unit may be addressed.298
However, Domestic never sought clarification of the bargaining unit
through this procedure. Rather, Domestic went on as it had previously
and continued to recognize the mixed bargaining unit.'
Furthermore, since 1955, the Teamsters had contended that the
supervisors were "route relief drivers" who should be included in
both the bargaining unit and the pension fund?" In 1960, a heated
disagreement arose between Domestic and the Teamsters over the
status of the supervisors."' Domestic unilaterally tried to remove the
supervisors from the bargaining unit and discontinue paying the
supervisor's pension benefits."e The Teamsters responded with a series of wildcat strikes? 3 Then, during two strikes in 1970 and 1971,
the Teamsters allegedly informed the supervisors that if they crossed
the picket line they would lose their pension benefits.' 4 However,
this disagreement reached its hottest point during the strike of 1986
when Domestic was going to withdraw completely from the pension
fund." It was then that the Teamsters allegedly threatened Domestic, stating that they were ready to put Domestic out of business
before they would compromise on the pension issue.3" The strike
also brought with it alleged threats and actual violence directed at
persons and property.'r 7 Of all its possible options, Domestic chose
to file civil RICO claims against the Teamsters."e The court found
that Domestic's decision to pursue a civil RICO action was appropri1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965) and Safeway Stores. Inc. v. Retail Clerk Int'l
Ass'n, 261 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1953)).
298. Id. at 1478 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 102.60 (1989)).
299. The term mixed bargaining unit is being used to describe a bargaining unit made up
of employees who are both supervisors and non-supervisors.
300. Domestic Linen Supply, 772 F. Supp. at 1475. Indeed, this contention is at the core

of Domestics' mail fraud allegation (the payments made to the pension on behalf of the
supervisors on the representation that they were "route relief drivers" was a fraudulent

scheme). Id. at 1477.
301.

Id. The alleged series of predicate acts had occurred within ten years of the passage

of RICO, in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5), and were included in Domestic's amended
complaint.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305.

Id.

306. Id.
307. Id. at 1475.
308. Domestic could have utilized the NLRB's unit clarification process, filed an unfair
labor practice charge against the union, sought police assistance in controlling the violence, or
filed a traditional suit for damages.
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ate because "where the NLRA does not totally preempt competing
law, there is no obligation for an aggrieved person to first exhaust
[their] administrative remedies before the NLRB, even though the
Board could order remedies which could effectively remedy the
wrongful conduct."3" In addition, because the demand for the inclusion of the supervisors into the bargaining unit was an unfair labor
practice, not a legitimate goal, the court held that the violence that
occurred during the strike and the threat to put Domestic out of business was not precluded from the Hobbs Act."'0
VI.

CALCEUS MAJOR SUBVERTIT:

ARE RICO's SHOES Too LARGE?
The Supreme Court, along with the rest of the legal community,
continues to grapple with the complexities of RICO's interpretation.
Furthermore, RICO's treble damages and attorney's fees give plaintiffs and their attorneys incentives and excuses to utilize the statute,
clearly leading to abuse and overuse. Indeed, even when the government uses civil RICO there can be abuses or mistakes in judgment.
Surely not every labor union that the government moves against can
be as bad as the union in Local 560 and deserving of the same degree of punishment. For every Goliath there is a David waiting for
the chance to attack. In RICO's case, a union does have stones to
cast that may not bring down the giant but may save it from RICO's
grasp.
A.

Constitutional Attack: Vagueness

RICO's constitutionality, until recently, had been laid to rest.3'
In RICO actions, both civil and criminal, the federal courts had "uniformly and rigidly rejected constitutional assaults on the statute." '
However, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. revived the idea that defendants may be

309. Id. (quoting Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 66 (1966)).
310. Id. at 1476-77.
311.

Paul A. Batista, After 'H.J. Inc.': Circuit Review of RICO Part One, N.Y. LJ., June

20, 1990, at 3. But cf Simonoff & Lieverman, supra note 6, at 345-46. Simonoff suggests
that the Supreme Court's decision in H.J. Inc. meant merely that "it is far easier to successfully plead a pattern of racketeering activity than explain what it means." Id. at 345. Furthermore, Simonoff contends that the Supreme Court only decided "that multiple schemes/victims
were not a necessary perquisite to finding a racketeering pattern .
Id. at 346.
312. Id.
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able to launch a credible constitutional challenge against RICO.313
1. Justice Scalia's Invitation
The constitutional weakness in RICO to which Justice Scalia

speaks is RICO's pattern requirement which may be unconstitutionally
vague." 4 In H.J. Inc., the Supreme Court reaffirmed RICO's pattern
of racketeering requirement of continuity plus relationship producing a
pattern, and stated that continuity was both a closed and open-ended
concept. Justice Scalia was quick to criticize this idea, expressing that

he had no idea what a closed period of repeated conduct meant." 5
However, Justice Scalia was unable to provide an interpretation of

RICO's pattern requirement that would give any more guidance regarding its application.3"6 Consequently, he warned that this "bodes

ill for the day" when the constitutional vagueness challenge is presented to the Supreme Court.17 This warning is especially significant because "the Supreme Court said that RICO must be read expansively, not narrowly, to give effect to the language of the statute,
even ifCongress may not have intended the result."' The trend has
been that judicial interpretations have effectively broadened the scope
of RICO.31 9
2. Firestone v. Galbreath
The first clear crack in RICO, which has yet to be fully repaired,
2
In Firestone, the
occurred in the case of Firestone v. Galbreath."

313. HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
314. Id. at 241-42.
315. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Edward Brodsky, Civil RICO - The ProposedAmendments, N.Y. LJ., Nov. 9, 1990,
at 3 (emphasis added) (noting that RICO's legislative history did not indicate that the statute
was designed to expand the scope of securities laws. and citing Securities Investor Protection
Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990), which held that there is no purchaser-seller
requirement in a RICO civil securities fraud action). The Supreme Court has acknowledged
that civil RICO has been applied under circumstances not specifically addressed or anticipated
by Congress, however, the Supreme Court has stated that this is a manifestation of civil
RICO's breadth, not its ambiguity. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Inrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985).
The Supreme Court has also stated that if this is a defect, it "is inherent in the statute as
written, and its correction must lie with Congress." Id.
319. Brodsky, supra note 318.
320. 747 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ohio 1990), afd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 279 (6th
Cir. 1992). The court of appeals did not pass upon the constitutional aspects of the RICO
claim because adjudication of that claim was not necessary; however, it did state that the
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Southern District of Ohio took up Justice Scalia's invitation by declaring RICO's "pattern of racketeering activity" requirement unconstitutionally vague. 2 The court noted that for a statute to be unconstitutionally vague it must fail "to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that [their] contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute."3 The conduct of that individual is examined against the facts
of that particular case, and if the statute is vague to that individual
under those circumstances, that individual has standing to challenge
that statute or provisions therein."' Unlike other courts that have
also had defendants urge them to take up Justice Scalia's invitation,324 the Firestone court found that the defendants had standing to
challenge the statute."
The Firestone defendants' accountants and attorneys found themselves enmeshed in their client's family dispute over a relative's
remaining estate.3" A situation "in all likelihood far removed from
the typical situations which Congress envisioned as being within
RICO's scope of coverage."327 The court concluded that individuals
of ordinary intelligence in the defendants' circumstances, facing a
family dispute, would not have had adequate notice that the alleged
offenses complained of would constitute a pattern of racketeering."
The court found that the pattern of racketeering requirement was unconstitutionally vague as applied to these defendants, and persuaded
by Justice Scalia's suggestion, went on to declare that RICO's pattern
of racketeering element was unconstitutionally vague as written.329
However, Firestone did not create a fire-storm to envelop RICO
or any part or provision therein. Rather, the reviewing court allowed
the flame to go out, at least for now. The Sixth Circuit in its

plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a RICO claim. 976 F.2d 279.
321. Firestone, 747 F. Supp. at 1579-80.

322. Id. at 1580 (citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
323.
324.

Id
See, e.g., United States v. Angiulo, 879 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v.

Robinson, No. 89 CR 907, 1990 WL 77780 (N.D. Il. May 17, 1990).
325.

Firestone, 747 F. Supp. at 1581.

326. Id.
327. Id. Cf. United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1179 (1st Cir. 1990) (ruling that
defendants faced with situations of gambling, loan-sharking and conspiracy would have adequate notice that their conduct would be prohibited by the statute). It remains an open question as to whether employees exercising their § 7 rights under the NLRA would have adequate notice that their conduct might be prohibited under RICO.
328. Firestone, 747 F. Supp. at 1581 (mail and wire fraud, interstate transportation of stolen property and money laundering).

329. Id.
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Firestone decision found that the District Court was correct, insofar
as that the plaintiffs had failed to plead the RICO claims properly.3"
The grandchildren in that action lacked standing to bring RICO
" ' However, the Sixth Circuit found that it was unnecessary
claims.33
and undesirable to pass upon the constitutional aspects of the RICO
claim and expressly distanced itself from that portion of the lower
court's decision."' Thus, for the moment, Firestone stands alone333
with no hope of being vindicated in the near future, despite Justice
Scalia's open invitation. Clearly, each and every time an employer or
the government raises the RICO sword to a labor organization, this
argument must now be included.
B. The First Amendment Attack
The First Amendment attack upon RICO is an attack against
Congress' limiting of union members' rights of association. The Supreme Court, as far back as 1921, has declared that the "right of
employees to self-organization [is] a 'fundamental right,"' which
includes the right of employees to organize and select their own
representatives.3 ' Indeed, the national labor policy has been to encourage "the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and [to
protect] the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of
their employment or other mutual aid or protection."335
The statute that has reached the furthest with respect to limitations on the association of union members is the Landrum-Griffin
Act, which forbids access to union offices by convicted felons and
authorizes their removal upon conviction.336 However, "there is no
330.

Firestone v. Galbreath, 976 F.2d 279, 286 (6th Cir. 1992).

331.

Id. at 285.
Id.

332.
333.
(1991);
(1991);

See United States v. Glecier, 923 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 54
United States v. Coiro, 922 F.2d 1008 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2826
United States v. Woods, 915 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947

(1991); United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846
(1990); United States v. Paccione, 738 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); United States v.
Gigante, 737 F. Supp. 292 (D.NJ. 1990); United States v. Lobue, 751 F. Supp. 748 (N.D.
Ill. 1990).
334. Mangum, supra note 35, at 102 (citing American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Trades
Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921), and DAVID FELLMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION 43 (1963)).
335. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) (emphasis added).
336. Mangum, supra note 35, at 102. State law may set stricter guidelines for those who
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precedent in either statute or case law for removing from office the
legally elected officers of a union for having condoned a situation

which demonstrably

results in a pattern of racketeering

and

'
corruption."337
To have such a procedure, which is nothing more

than a shortcut to investigation and prosecution, would clearly appear
to violate one's constitutional right to association.3"
This is the exact course of action that the government takes each
and every time it asks to have a RICO trustee installed into union
office, while using its aiding and abetting approach. 39 In addition,
the government argues that the First Amendment does not protect any
right in association or speech that takes place in order to carry out

unlawful activity.'

Because Congress had the constitutional power

wish to hold union office; see John F. Gibbons & Louis J. Weber, Inl, Recent Decision, 59
NOTRE DAME L. Rnv. 817 (1984) (presenting a full discussion on the New Jersey Casino
Control Act's effects on union activity).
337. Mangum, supra note 35, at 102.
338. Mangum, supra note 35, at 103.
339. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
340. Mastro, supra note 2, at 616-17 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968)). The Supreme Court stated that when speech and non-speech combine in the same
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the non-speech
element can justify incidental limitation on First Amendment freedoms; but the government's
course of conduct must be to (1) further an important or substantial governmental interest,
and (2) the governmental interest must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and
(3) the incidental restriction on the First Amendment freedom must be no greater than is
essential for the furtherance of that interest. Id. See Northeast Woman's Ctr., Inc. v.
McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1990). Anti-abortion
activists could be liable under RICO for their intimidation and harassment of an abortion
center resulting in destruction of the center's property, and they were not protected on the
ground that their actions were motivated by their political beliefs. Id. "The First Amendment,
which guarantees individuals freedom of conscience and prohibits governmental interference
with religious beliefs, does not shield from government scrutiny practices which imperil public safety, peace or order." Id. at 1348. Furthermore, despite the absence of any economic
motivation on the part of defendants, the Third Circuit upheld RICO liability. Id. But see,
United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that RICO enterprise or predicate
acts must have financial purpose); United States v. Flynn, 852 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988) (stating that RICO enterprise must be directed towards an economic goal). See NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994). In NOW, the Supreme Court
found that the enterprise referred to in §§ 1962(a) and (b) "is the victim of unlawful activity
and may very well be a 'profit-seeking' entity that represents a property interest.
...
Id.
at 804. However, this statutory language does not "mandate that the enterprise be a 'profitseeking' entity, it simply requires that the enterprise be an entity that was acquired through
illegal activity or the money generated from illegal activity:' Id. Further, the Supreme Court
also found that if the enterprise referred to in § 1962(c) "is not being acquired, it need not
have a property interest that can be acquired nor an economic motive for engaging in illegal
activity; it need only be an association in fact that engages in a pattern of racketeering activity." Id. (footnote omitted). It is worth noting that employees and union members exercising
their § 7 rights for higher wages or better benefits are not criminally extorting money, there-
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to enact RICO, and RICO litigation serves the very important public
interest of eliminating organized crime and racketeering activity, a
public interest is served which is unrelated to the suppression of
freedom of expression. For this reason RICO should be able to withstand any First Amendment challenges? 4' Indeed, the government
feels that the First Amendment does not immunize racketeering activities just because those activities include association or speech, and the
only idea that may possibly be suppressed is that crime pays. 2
However, Justice Souter stated in a recent Supreme Court decision,
National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, "that RICO actions
could deter protected advocacy and.., courts applying RICO [are
cautioned] to bear in mind the First Amendment interest that could be
at stake. ' ' 3 Furthermore, RICO has the authority to allow the court

to "prohibit[] any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor
as the enterprise engaged in ....

."'

The sad irony is that the

Norris-LaGuardia Act provides adequate protection to prevent a union,
a union officer, or a union member from being held liable or respon-

sible for unlawful acts of individual union officers or members, except upon clear proof of actual participation." However, RICO uses

a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.' In addition,
RICO has gone further in some cases, holding "that a union may be

fore, these same employees and union members would not have an illegal economic goal or
financial purpose even if it can be shown that they were an association in fact.
341. See Mastro, supra note 2, at 616-20. However, RICO "does not bar First Amendment challenges to RICO's application in particular cases." NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct.
798, 806 (1994) (Souter, J.,concurring).
[L]egitimate free-speech claims may be raised and addressed in individual RICO
cases as they arise. Accordingly, it is important to stress that nothing in the
Court's opinion precludes a RICO defendant from raising the First Amendment in
its defense in a particular case. Conduct alleged to amount to Hobbs Act extortion,
for example . . . may turn out to be fully protected First Amendment activity,
entitling the defendant to dismissal on that basis. And even in a case where a
RICO violation has been validly established, the First Amendment may limit the
relief that can be granted against an organization otherwise engaging in protected
expression.
Id. at 807 (citations omitted).
342. Trade Waste Management Ass'n v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 238 (3d Cir. 1985).
343. NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 807 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
344. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a).
345. 29 U.S.C. § 106.
346. "It is not necessary that the defendant has been convicted of a criminal offense that
forms the predicate act or even that he/she has been criminally charged. It is only necessary
that the defendant in fact committed the acts for which he/she could have been criminally
charged." Simonoff & Lieverman, supra note 6, at 340 (emphasis in original) (citing Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 480, 493 (1985)). See supra note 8.
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held vicariously liable under RICO for the wrongful conduct of its
president."' 7 However, vicarious liability is limited in application to
when the union is named as a defendant, or as a person as opposed
to an enterprise.'
VII.

CONCLUSION

RICO does not exist in a vacuum and can substantially and
materially affect the interests of labor unions, union democracy, and
the collective bargaining process. Indeed, there has been much praise
when RICO, in the hands of the government, is used to positively
affect those interests by stabilizing and removing labor racketeering
elements from the union and ensuring that the rights of workers are
secured by democratic means. Consequently, the goals of civil RICO,
as used by the government, have been stated clearly and demonstrated
accordingly. The government follows RICO's statutory intent by pursuing and dealing with the unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime and their infiltration and takeover of legitimate labor
unions. It is bitter medicine that is necessary, but whose long term
effects may be merely equivocal and temporal. 9
However, there are different results when civil RICO is used by
employers. Indeed, the possibilities of being awarded treble damages
and attorney's fees may blind the private users to RICO's true purpose. Surely the RICO statute, like the Hobbs Act, was not intended
to stand watchman over labor organizations' conduct of strikes, organizational campaigns, collective bargaining, or any other lawful use of
self interest. Additionally, theories of vicarious liability and the use of
injunctions by the private sector upset that delicate balance that has
been struck by Congress between labor and management.
Therefore, private civil RICO actions in the field of labor relations should be proscribed. Such a bright-line rule would leave the
government with the power to combat organized crime and labor
racketeering, and ensure union democracy, while not de-stabilizing the
balance between employers and labor organizations which has been
created and maintained by the Norris-LaGuardia, Wagner, Taft-

347. Peter R. Schlam & Ahuva Genack, Union's Vicarious Liability Under RICO, N.Y.
LJ., Oct. 12, 1990, at 3 (discussing the decision in Amendolare v. Schenkers Int'l Forward.

ers Inc., 747 F. Supp. 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), in which members of Teamsters Local 295
brought a civil action against their local, its officers and other entities).
348. Schlam & Genack, supra note 347, at 3.
349. See supra notes 150-53, 163-69, 178-90 and accompanying text.
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Hartley, and Landrum-Griffin Acts.
Steven T. Ieronimo
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